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Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of monetary policy on mutual fund risk taking using a sample of 
Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds in the 2000-2012 period. Firstly I estimate time-varying 
measures of risk exposure (betas) for the individual funds, for the benchmark portfolio, as well 
as for a representative equally-weighted portfolio, through 24-month rolling regressions of a 
two-factor model with two systematic risk factors: interest rate risk (TERM) and default risk 
(DEF). Next, in the second phase, using the estimated betas, I try to understand what portion of 
the risk exposure is in excess of the benchmark (active risk) and how it relates to monetary 
policy proxies (one-month rate, Taylor residual, real rate and first principal component of a 
cross-section of government yields and rates). Using this methodology, I provide empirical 
evidence that Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds respond to accommodative monetary policy 
by significantly increasing exposure, in excess of their benchmarks, to default risk rate and 
slightly to interest risk rate as well. I also find that the increase in funds’ risk exposure to gain a 
boost in return (search-for-yield) is more pronounced following the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis, indicating that the current historic low interest rates may incentivize excessive risk taking. 
My results suggest that monetary policy affects the risk appetite of non-bank financial 
intermediaries.  





As an asset class, high yield debt has benefitted immensely from the low interest rate policies 
adopted by central banks worldwide following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, as it has 
evolved into a key asset class for investors achieving a yield pick-up. Dealogic reports that 
European high-yield bond issuances total $156 billion as of November 2014, overtaking 2013’s 
record value of $125 billion. Additionally, this asset class has delivered extremely attractive 
returns gaining about 16% since 2009 (Pictet Asset Management (2014)). The expectation is that 
the accommodative monetary cycle is here to stay, which leads to low volatility and interest 
rates, leaving investors hungry to maintain their returns in the midst of declining returns or even 
to obtain higher returns by investing in riskier products.  
According to the European Central Bank (EBC) (2014) this robust demand for riskier assets has 
been evident not only in the low yields of both sovereign and corporate bonds but also “in the 
valuations of other assets”. This clearly indicates investor’s greater demand for risk, a 
phenomenon dubbed search-for-yield, which has been most obvious through the loosening of 
lending standards by commercial banks, but is also present in credit pricing by other financial 
intermediaries. The Joint Committee of the EU Supervisory Authorities pinpoint search-for-yield 
as investing in “less liquid, riskier, and longer duration assets” as well as though the use of off-
balance sheet investment vehicles (2014). This paper attempts to understand whether Portuguese 
fixed-income mutual funds have increased their risk exposure to gain a boost in their return 
following the methodology applied by Gungor and Sierra (2014) on Canadian fixed-income 
mutual funds.  
Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds are important players in credit markets and for this reason 
may help shed light about how central banks’ actions affect the economic system. Not only do 
they hold public and private debt but also represent a significant slice of the market. According 
to data from the European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA) total net assets 
under management totaled 1.7 billion euros by year-end, representing a market share of 30.21% 
(2013). Additionally, mutual funds may affect the availability of credit through their 
participation in the repo market as well as the potential for fire sales of assets under management 
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given clusters of investors redeeming their shares simultaneously as mutual funds have 
demandable equity (Gungor and Sierra (2014)).  
Beyond their role in the credit market, mutual fund structure and managerial incentives make 
them an interesting intermediary to study the search-for-yield phenomenon. Recall that not only 
are fund flows convex (i.e., funds that outperform their peers receive a larger inflow than the 
outflow observed by funds that underperform), but also fund management companies are paid a 
fixed percentage of total assets under management (fees). For example, in my sample, annual 
management fees are most frequently 95 basis points, averaging slighting lower at 89.5 basis 
points.  
Macroeconomic variables have a significant influence on fund flows. In the midst of a distressed 
economy, bonds tend to attract more investors since they are safer and thus mutual fund flows 
will go up. However, it is precisely in these conditions that central banks intervene with 
expansionary policies that push down interest rates and ramp up liquidity in attempt to stimulate 
the economy. The combination of greater flows but lower rates can create an incentive for funds 
to increase risks to obtain higher yields. This possibility is especially evident when one considers 
that managerial compensation depends on assets under management, which subsequently 
depends on returns relative to benchmark.  
It should be noted that Gungor and Sierra’s (2014) methodology, which breaks down the passive 
and active risk of a mutual fund requires a benchmark, i.e. fund managers following a stipulated 
benchmark. This is important to note as the Financial Times reported that this practice might 
actually distort the market through incentivizing fund managers to have full weights in large and 
risky securities (Authers (2014)). For this reason, other literature seeking empirical evidence for 
the search-for-yield phenomenon concentrates on the actual fund holdings through checking if a 
systematic bias exists between high yield holdings versus investment grade ones such as Becker 
and Ivashina (2012) and Choi and Kronlund (2014).  
While there are ample studies available studying equity mutual funds, there are only a few 
studies about fixed-income mutual funds. Cici, Gibson and Merrick (2011) considered how bond 
pricing differs from fund to fund and found that price dispersion is positively correlated with 
volatility and maturity and is negatively so with credit quality and size of issuance. Cici and 
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Gibson (2012) went on to consider the costs and benefits of active management and concluded 
that the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Finally, Chen and Qin (2014) examined flows into 
funds and found that funds were not only sensitive to performance but also to macro 
fundamentals.  
Even though search-for-yield has been pinpointed as one of the drivers of credit accumulation 
leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Yellen (2011) and Rajan (2010)), there is lack of 
empirical evidence of the phenomenon (Becker and Ivashina (2012)). Gungor and Sierra’s work 
considered the dynamic risk exposures of Canadian fixed-income mutual funds and found 
empirical evidence linking monetary policy to risk exposure. More specifically, the funds in their 
sample increased their exposure to default risk as interest rates fell, a reaction most pronounced 
following the 2007-2009 financial crisis. However, other approaches including both Becker and 
Ivashina (2012) and Choi and Kronlund (2014), find empirical evidence of the phenomenon 
through considering portfolio constitutions. Becker and Ivashina (2012) consider insurance 
companies, which differ from mutual funds due to regulatory requirements, but found clear 
evidence of a systematic bias toward higher yields albeit being conditional to credit ratings. 
Likewise, Choi and Kronlund (2014) found that American mutual funds also search-for-yield 
using mainly non-AAA investment grade corporate bonds meaning that they hold more of these 
bonds than the bond indices do. These funds were also found to participate in “negative search-
for-yield” by shying away from high yield debt. The results suggested that the return was 
generated as a consequence of common risk factors as opposed to superior bond picking.  
In this paper, I will apply the Gungor and Sierra (2014) methodology, which tries to detect 
search-for-yield in Portuguese mutual funds in two phases. In the first phase, I estimate a time-
varying measure risk exposure for the individual funds (betas) as well as for their benchmarks 
using rolling regressions of a model with two systematic risk factors: interest rate risk (TERM) 
and default risk (DEF). The risk exposure of the benchmarks provides a proxy measure for 
passive changes. In the second phase, using the previously estimated betas, I will test if funds’ 
active risk exposures (i.e., in excess of the passive exposure of the benchmark) vary with 
monetary policy. This analysis relies on the definition of passive and active management 
employed as the fundamental assumption. For this purpose, I rely on the Cremers and Petajisto’s 
(2009) definition: passive management is considered to be tracking an index’s return by holding 
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all, or most of, the assets within an index. That being said, deviations from this passive approach 
are considered to be active management decisions. As passive exposure is not static, the model is 
calibrated to take into account time-varying risk factors (at the monthly frequency). 
The results suggest that a typical fund adjusts both its default and its interest rate risk exposure 
over time. Regarding default risk exposures, negative and statistically significant coefficients 
indicate that, across the board, the typical Portuguese fixed-income mutual fund exposes itself to 
more risk, most likely in the form of holding assets with higher yields, in response to falling 
interest rates and expansionary monetary policies. Additionally, it is clear that the shift to boost 
risk in response to falling rates occurred in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, which 
suggests that the period of historically low rates encourages funds to generate returns with 
recourse to greater default risk.  
The results concerning interest rate are less obvious as two of the monetary policy alternatives 
studied (one-month Euribor and policy rule residual) reveal negative and statistically significant 
coefficients, which indicate that funds increase their exposure to interest rate risk when facing 
lower interest rates. The magnitude of these coefficients is smaller than that observed for default 
risk. However, if one considers the ex-post policy rate, the coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant. These results become more coherent when the analysis is split into two subperiods, 
again with a clear shift in the aftermath the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Overall, mutual funds 
increase their default and interest rate risk exposure when facing historically low rates during the 
crisis period. These results are robust at the individual fund level, rather than using equal 
weighted portfolio of fixed-income funds. 
2. Methodology 
The methodology attempts to associate the time varying risk fixed-income funds face to 
monetary policy. Fama and French (1993) identify two standard risk factors portfolio returns are 
subject to both default and interest rate risk and enable both an intuitive and parsimonious 
characterization of fixed-income returns. Hence, as in Gungor and Sierra (2014), I assume that 
the following model describes excess returns of fixed-income funds: 
, , , , , ,  (1) 
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where ,  is excess return of fund p in the month t, which is computed by removing the one-
month Euribor rate from the funds’ realized monthly return in local currency. The two 
explanatory variables, DEF and TERM, are proxies for default risk and interest rate risk 
respectively. DEF is the difference between the value-weighted portfolio of Euro-area long-term 
government bond returns and the value weighted portfolio of corporate bond returns. TERM is 
the difference between the value-weighted portfolio of Euro-area long-term government bonds 
and the one-month Euribor rate. Thus, , and ,  estimate fund p’s exposure to risk at 
month t. Finally  ,  is the pricing error, and ,  the zero mean error term that is uncorrelated 
with the risk factors.  
In the presence of time-varying risk, , and ,  will vary over time. To avoid systematic 
biases (Ferson and Schadt (1996)) and to allow for time variation in risk exposures, the model is 
estimated for each individual fund p using a 24-month rolling window, which yields time 
varying coefficients. The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2012, which covers 
not only Portugal’s adoption of the single currency (2001) but also various instances of ECB rate 
cuts (2008, 2009, 2012) as well as rises (2011) among other critical moments in the European 
sovereign debt crisis.  
There are two sources for time variation in , and , : a change due to the fund manager’s 
actions, which I consider to be an active one (i.e., a shift in the underlying assets’ risk exposures 
(Ang and Kristensen (2012)), or in the weight given to each asset within the portfolio, which I 
consider to be passive change. Recall that fund managers try to beat their benchmark and to do 
this they will buy underpriced assets or take bets on systematic factors that they expect will 
outplay the market. Managers can only outperform their benchmarks through holding a portfolio 
that deviates from the benchmark. However, the danger of doing so would be to underperform 
their benchmark, which can potentially lead to outflows or even fund manager termination 
(Chevalier and Ellison (1999)). The result is that, in practice, managers hold portfolios that are 
like their benchmarks with some slight differences.  For the purpose of the subsequent analysis, I 
will use the Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) definition of passive management as a strategy of 
owning the securities of a particular benchmark in the proportions used within the benchmark 
and active management as any deviation from passive management.  
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Having said this, the main purpose of this study is to understand whether fixed-income mutual 
fund managers actively subject themselves to a greater level of risk when interest rates are low. 
This would show that central banks’ actions affect fund managers’ risk tolerance, as proxied by 
the time varying , and ,  of the portfolios they manage. In order to control for any 
changes in betas due factors unrelated to managerial actions, the passive component of time 
variation is controlled for and only the remaining changes are related to monetary policy.  
Recall that the beta of a portfolio, including the benchmark portfolio, is the weighted average of 
the individual asset’s betas. Having said this, this rationale implies that a portfolio p’s beta can 
be broken down into two parts: the benchmark or passive beta and any deviations from beta (i.e., 
the active managerial decisions): 
, , , , ,  
This implies that an index fund, which replicates the return of a passive index and thus does not 
have deviations from the benchmark, should have a intercept of approximately zero, a slope 
about equal to one, and a R-squared of approximately one. Furthermore, if some of the weights 
of the assets differ from the weights attributed in the benchmark composition but are not time-
varying , , Δ 0  then the manager actively varied the portfolio 
composition and any time variation among betas cannot be explained through a dynamic strategy 
but rather to time variation in the individual securities’ betas ( , .  Also, if there is correlation 
between the time variation in ,  and an information variable , then regression portfolio 
betas on the benchmark beta and information variable may find a statistically significant 
coefficient for  even if the manager is not dynamically changing portfolio composition as a 
function of .  
Hence to understand if the active portion of fixed-income mutual fund risk is linked to 
information variables , , and ,  are described as linear functions of the passive 
benchmark portfolio and information variables as follows: 
, , ,  
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, , ,  
The linear functions are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Time-varying benchmark 
passive betas ( ,   are estimated using a 24-month rolling window on monthly data, and   
includes observable macroeconomic variables at time t-1. 
 includes monetary policy variables (mp) as well as two control variables: the term spread 
(ts) and the default spread (ds). I consider four monetary policy variables: (1) residuals from the 
interest rate policy rule, more commonly known as the Taylor rule, (2) the ex-post real interest 
rate, (3) the short term rate, which in this case is the one-month rate, and (4) the first principal 
component of a cross-section of sovereign German bund yields and short term interest rates (one-
, three-, and six-month rates).  
The default and term spreads used are different from the ones previously employed in equation 
(1). The default spread is obtained by subtracting an index of Euro-area AA-rated long-term 
corporate bonds from an index of Euro-area BBB-rated long-term corporate bonds, taken from 
Iboxx via DataStream. This yield spread between these long-term corporate bonds captures the 
business conditions. The term spread is the yield spread between long- and short-term 
government bonds and is obtained by subtracting the yield of two-year Euro-area government 
bonds from the yield of ten-year Euro-area government bonds, sourced from the ECB statistical 
warehouse. The term spread has been pinpointed as a good gauge of economic activity (Estrella 
and Hardouvelis (1991)) and Fama and Bliss (1987)). Additionally, as aforementioned, Fama 
and French (1993) single out term and default spread as sound forecasters of excess portfolio 
returns on passive portfolios of both bonds and stocks.  
3. Data Description 
The mutual fund data is from Lipper. The data includes monthly returns in local currency (net-
of-fees), total net asset under management, management fees, flow as a percentage of total net 
assets as well as technical benchmark names and returns for each of the mutual funds domiciled 
in Portugal from January 1998 to December 2012 (180 months).  The initial sample includes 119 
unique funds and their corresponding benchmarks. Note that although benchmarks may vary 
amongst funds they are most commonly Citigroup Indices. 
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I require a fund to have at least 24-months of continuous data to estimate betas. I study the 
period from January 2000 to December 2012, although prior years are used to obtain the initial 
estimates of beta (January 2000). After applying these filters, the sample includes 90 unique 
funds. Unlike Gungor and Sierra (2014), this filter does not create the risk of survivorship bias as 
the funds studied only have to have at least 24 months of continuous observations within the 
twelve year period and some of the funds in the sample were liquidated or merged with other 
funds within the analysis timeframe. Panel A of Table 1 presents fund data descriptive statistics. 
The average fund has total net assets valued at €141.29 million and a return of 0.15% per month.  
The data for the systematic risk factors is from DataStream, the St. Louis FED, and Bloomberg. 
DEF is computed by subtracting the long-term government bond yields for the Euro area from 
the Iboxx index of Euro area corporates. Likewise, TERM is computed by subtracting the lagged 
1-month Euribor (Bloomberg) from the long-term bond yields for the Euro area.  
I employ four alternative proxies of monetary policy, two of which are relative and the other two 
absolute. The relative indicators are the ex-post real rate and the policy rule residual. The ex-post 
real rate is computed by subtracting the present realized twelve-month inflation from the lagged 
three-month Euribor rate. The policy rule, more commonly known as the Taylor rule, associates 
both the real and nominal rates with a measure of output gap. Thus, the residual of the policy rule 
is the residuals of a simple OLS regression of the three-month Euribor rate on the twelve-month 
inflation and a measure of output gap. The measure of the output gap is obtained using European 
Central Bank Euro-area gross domestic product data. Additionally, the two absolute indicators 
are the one-month Euribor rate and the first component from a cross section of German 
government bonds yields and Euribor rates. The cross section includes one-, three- and six-
month Euribor rates as well as one-, two-, three-, five-, seven- and ten-year German government 
bond yields, all obtained from Bloomberg. The first component is used as it best captures 
duration-risk channel changes within portfolio returns (Gungor and Sierra (2014)). 
These proxies are commonly used in other studies, namely Gambacrota (2009), Bekaert and 
Duca (2013), Jimenez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2008), Iannidou, Ongena, and Peydró 
(2010) and Gungor and Sierra (2014). One difference is the use of the one-month Euribor rate as 
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proxy for the short-term rate instead of the more commonly applied overnight rate as the former 
shows greater variability.  
Figure 1 shows the four alternative monetary policy indicators. The variables are closely related 
and follow a similar pattern across time. As expected, the variables rise leading up to the 
financial crisis and peak in September 2008. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
nominal rates (described through the one-month Euribor) fell and were maintained low, while 
ex-post real rates also fell below zero.   
Regarding the default and term spreads used as control variables, the data is obtained from Iboxx 
indexes sourced from DataStream and the European Central Bank’s statistical warehouse. The 
default spread is the difference between AA-rated and BBB-rated long-term Euro-area corporate 
bond yields while the term spread is the difference between ten-year (long-term) and two-year 
(short-term) Euro-area government bond yields.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the monetary policy and control variables.  
4. Results  
I first show evidence of time-varying risk in mutual fund returns. Figure 2 shows the volatility of 
the monthly average fund return calculated using a 24-month rolling window, as an initial 
measure of aggregate risk using the average monthly return computed by averaging each 
individual funds’ return and then taking the 24-month rolling standard deviation of this average. 
Clearly, the risk of fixed-income mutual funds varies substantially over time. It is especially 
clear that volatility spiked in the beginning of the crisis, in 2007, and rose even steeper following 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, unlike the volatility of Canadian mutual funds for 
the same period, as examined by Gungor and Sierra (2014), Portuguese volatility did not fall in 
the onset of the crisis and has risen steadily since 2007 only beginning to drop in 2012. One 
probable explanation for this increased volatility is the European sovereign debt crisis and the 
subsequent EU and FMI Economic Adjustment Program (lead by the so-called “Troika”) to bail 
Portugal out following the subprime mortgage crisis. Furthermore, interest rate cuts provide 
evidence that mutual fund return risk is not constant as the European Central Bank (ECB) cut 
rates multiple times in 2008 and 2009, and only to raise rates slightly in 2011 and to cut them 
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drastically, to historical lows, from 2012 forward in an attempt to regain access to credit markets 
and ultimately stimulate growth. As of September 2014 the refinancing rate, the rate at which 
banks lend money to one another, sits at five basis points, which is lower than it has ever been.  
4.1 Risk Exposures 
Figures 3a and 3b present the average DEF and TERM exposures of the equally-weighted funds 
as well as the benchmarks (passive portfolio). The sample period is from January 2000 to 
December 2012, and is partitioned into subperiods of high and low interest rates, where the cut-
off point is the median one-month Euribor rate in the period (2.39%). The first high period (rates 
above the median rate) is from January 2000 until from April 2003, followed by a period of 
lower rates from May 2003 until January 2006 when rates begin to increase again and continue 
to do so from February 2006 until December 2008 and finally, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, a period of low rates from January 2009 until the end of the sample period. Default risk 
exposure is, on average, relatively flat and tends to be lower than the benchmark’s exposure. 
However, following the crisis the average default exposure jumps, as does that of the benchmark. 
Interest risk rate is more volatile, but the current pattern exists, until the financial crisis, when 
rates are low (high) the average fund’s risk exposure is lower (higher) than the benchmark’s. As 
was the case with default risk, interest rate risk also jumps following the crisis. This suggests that 
in the face of historically low rates funds seek historically high risk exposures in an attempt to 
generate returns.  
Table 2 shows the cross-sectional distribution of the coefficients and t-statistics for the estimated 
alphas and betas of individual funds for equation (1), assuming the model parameters are static 
over time. Consistent with Gungor and Sierra (2014), on average, TERM is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. However, DEF is positive but not statistically significant 
at the 5% level, only becoming statistically relevant at 10%. These results show that mutual 
funds in our sample take interest rate and default risk into account when generating excess 
returns.  
As the empirical study is based on a two-factor model (see equation (1)), it is important to test 
the validity of the model prior to continuing an analysis. In order to do so I consider the model-
imposed constraint of pricing errors equal to zero. Since mutual fund returns are net-of-fees 
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while the factors used are not, this means that risk-adjusted returns are generally negative instead 
of being equal to zero (Fama and French (2010)). Table 2 shows that alpha is, on average, equal 
to -0.04 with a t-statistic equal to -3.25. The two-factor model explains, on average, 84%, of the 
changes in a typical fund’s excess return. This result is consistent with Gungor and Sierra (2014) 
who find that the two-factor model is responsible for 82% of the variation in their sample. Table 
2 supports that the two-factor model is an acceptable characterization of the average risk-return 
relationship for my sample of fixed-income funds.  
4.2 Risk Exposures and Monetary Policy 
I then consider how the active risk exposure of an equally-weighted portfolio of funds reacts to 
the monetary policy proxies. The equally-weighted portfolio can be viewed as a representative 
fund and can describe the average changes in risk exposures. Table 3 shows the coefficient and t-
statistics estimates for the two-factor model: , , , , , .  
The average fund has higher exposure to the TERM factor than to the DEF factor. When 
comparing the pre-crisis to the post-crisis data, it is clear that both term and default risk 
exposures have increased globally, which indicates that the mutual funds have not increased one 
exposure at the expense of another, but rather increased risk taking  
Next, I study whether and how the active portion of risk exposure of an equally-weighted 
portfolio of funds reacts over time to monetary policy changes. I take the risk exposures of the 
equally-weighted portfolio and the benchmark previously estimated using a 24-month rolling 
window. Then for each of the risk factors (DEF and TERM), I run a regression in which the 
dependent variable is the risk factor of the equally-weighted portfolio, and the explanatory 
variables are the benchmark risk factor and the monetary policy variables (and control variables). 
The resulting estimated coefficients, t-statistics and R-squared for each risk factor, DEF and 
TERM, are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The tables present not only the full 
estimation period from January 2000 until December 2012 in Panel A but also two subperiods in 
Panels B and C for the period prior to the crisis (from January 2000 until December 2006) and 
the period following the crisis (from January 2007 to December 2012).  
Table 4 shows how the average fund modifies its exposure to default risk as proxied by DEF. 
The monetary policy indicators have negative coefficients across the board when considering the 
  13
entire time period. The interpretation for this result is that the average fund exposes itself to 
greater default risk, meaning increasing the weight on high-yield debt in its portfolio, when 
interest rates fall and an expansionary monetary policy is in place. Additionally, Panel B and C 
consider whether this adjustment has changed due to the crisis and show that in fact this response 
to monetary policy is driven by the post-crisis period. Panel C shows that all of the monetary 
policy variables coefficients are negative and statistically significant, while in Panel B the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, with the exception of the first principal 
component. Thus, I conclude that it is exactly in the period with historically low interest rates 
that funds actively sought to increase the amount of default risk they were exposed to.  
Table 5 shows the results for a similar analysis using interest rate risk as proxied by TERM. Over 
the entire sample period, the results vary. When considering the one-month Euribor rate and the 
policy rule residual, it seems that as interest rates go down funds seek to expose themselves to a 
greater degree of interest rate risk. However, when I consider the ex-post real rate, as interest 
rates go down then exposure decreases as well. The results become clearer when I compare the 
pre- and post-crisis period. When looking at the pre-crisis period, funds tend to decrease their 
interest rate risk as interest rates decrease, a result that is clear from the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for the one-month Euribor rate, the policy rule residual, and the ex-post 
rule. This trend shifts after the crisis and during the period of historically low rates, as the 
average fund increases its interest rate risk in response to decreasing interest rates, as the 
aforementioned coefficients are negative and statistically significant.  
In summary, the results indicate that when interest rates fall, the typical fund will expose itself to 
greater default and interest rate risk. This strategy to generate return via risk is adopted by 
Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds following the financial crisis and the monetary policy 
decisions made since then.  
4.3 Individual Funds 
The analysis is then extended to an individual fund basis in an attempt to gauge the effect that 
monetary policy has on active risk exposure of individual Portugal fixed-income mutual funds. 
The need to extend the analysis beyond the equally-weighted portfolio is alluded by Roll (1977) 
and Ang, Lui and Schwarz (2010), since the creation of portfolios leads to a loss of cross-
  14
sectional information. For example, funds with differing coefficients and intercepts may cancel 
out within a portfolio subsequently leading to misleading conclusions and inference. Thus, 
individual funds are tested for active changes using the same two step procedure to assess 
whether the conclusions reached for the equally-weighted portfolio are robust. 
Table 6 reports the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated coefficients and respective t-
statistics resulting from the breakdown of , . On average, consistent with the equally-
weighted portfolio, the coefficients are all negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
with the exception of the first principal component. Also, the heteroskedasticity and serial-
correlation robust generalized method of moments (GMM) is used to test for joint significance 
and strongly rejects the null hypothesis that funds do not to actively adjust their risk exposures to 
changes in monetary policy. The average DEF exposure of funds from Table 6 is equal to 0.55 
suggesting that a decrease of 10 basis points in the one-month interest rate would render a 
12.57% higher default risk exposure. Across the 54 individual funds in my sample, at least 10 
have a statistically significant negative coefficient, peaking at 13 when the proxy is the ex-post 
real rate. This indicates that approximately 24% of the funds adjust their exposure to default risk 
negatively and statistically significantly to increasing policy rates. However, it should also be 
noted that across the alternative proxies at least six funds had positive reactions meaning that 
active exposure increases in response to increases in policy rates, peaking at 19, which is 
approximately 27.7%, when the policy rule residual is considered. Overall, the interpretation is 
that on average individual funds react to declines in interest rates and expansionary monetary 
policies by boosting active default risk exposure.  
Table 7 presents the results for the breakdown of , , which differ from the conclusions 
reached on an equally-weighted portfolio level. This same, rather unexpected, result is also 
observed by Gungor and Sierra (2014), as the coefficients are actually across the board positive 
and, with the exception of the first principal component, statistically significant. The GMM test 
for joint significance fails to reject the null hypothesis in all monetary proxy alternatives except 
the first principal component indicating that the fund in sample do not actively vary their interest 
rate exposure when rates change. At least 19 funds out of the 54 have statically significant non-
zero, either positive or negative, coefficient on the policy alternative. Interestingly, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients for interest rate risk exposures are the reverse of those estimated for 
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default risk exposures. The peaks of statistically significant non-zero coefficients are 21 out of 
54 funds (38.9%) with positive non-zero one-month rate coefficients and 19 out of 54 (27.8%) 
funds with negative non-zero coefficients for the policy rule residual. When considering the 
average number of funds that are statistically significant across all four alternative monetary 
variables, the average is higher for negative and statistically significant, indicating that the 
reaction of boosting interest rate risk exposure in response to falling rates is slightly stronger 
than decreasing risk as a response.  
Individual fund data seems to support the original equally-weighted portfolio findings suggesting 
that Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds clearly increase default risk exposure in response to a 
decrease in interest rates and expansionary monetary policies. Funds are also found to slightly 
increase their interest rate risk exposures in response to rate cuts.  
4.4 Economic Significance 
In addition to considering the statistical relevance of the findings, in order to complement my 
findings I will also consider the economic significance of the results. Table 8 presents the 
percentage change in risk exposure (DEF and TERM) given a one-standard deviation change in 
monetary policy variables. Panel A presents the estimates over the entire sample period. It is 
clear that default and interest rate risk exposures move in the same direction, albeit the change in 
default risk exposure is greater than that of interest risk rate. This is clear when one considers the 
average across all monetary policy alternatives, which is approximately 104% for default risk 
compared to interest rate risk’s 7.5%.  
There are stark differences between the years leading up to the crisis, pre-crisis in Panel B, and 
those following the crisis, post-crisis in Panel C, as the signs for both risk exposures change. 
That is, prior to the crisis, the funds respond to a decrease in rates by decreasing risk, a strategy 
that changes after the crisis to increasing risk when interest rates fall. One possible explanation 
for this phenomenon is that rates are currently at historical low levels, which may push fixed-
income mutual funds to pick up more yield in a riskier fashion than ever before. In sum, my 
results indicate that the changes in risk exposure in response to monetary policy changes are 




This paper shows that Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds increase their exposure to default 
risk and to some extent, however less apparent, their exposure to interest risk rate, in response to 
expansionary monetary policies and interest rate cuts.  
Using a linear two-factor pricing model, I estimate the dynamic risk exposures for individual 
funds, the benchmarks as well as for a representative equally-weighted portfolio. I then link these 
time-varying risk exposures to the benchmark’s exposure, which is indicative of the passive 
exposure, as well as macroeconomic variables. The results show that the individual fund’s 
exposure to both default and interest rate risk is not significantly explained by the benchmark’s 
exposure which indicates that the majority of funds, on average, seek to expose themselves to 
default risk, and somewhat to interest rate risk, as an active response to monetary policy. When I 
consider a representative equally-weighted portfolio I obtain similar results of statistically 
significant active portion of risk exposures increasing in reaction to accommodative monetary 
policy stances. Interestingly, the results clearly show a change in strategy following the 2007-
2009 financial crisis. While prior to the crisis, Portuguese fixed-income mutual funds actually 
decrease their risk exposures when interest rates fall, in the aftermath of the crisis they then 
shifted this response to increase risk when rate cuts occur suggesting that the current historically 
low rates induce extra-risk taking unseen before.  
My results suggest that monetary policy affects the risk appetite of non-bank financial 
intermediaries. In order to complement this analysis, it would be interesting to try to understand 
what the main drivers of search-for-yield within each individual fund are as well as to consider 
the actual holdings of the funds to see if the portion of investment grade to non-investment grade 
assets reflects my initial findings regarding risk exposures.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of mutual fund sample         
mean Stdev min max 
Total Net Assets 141.29 320.50 0.01 2870.07 
Return 0.15% 2.05% -49.93% 15.81% 
Excess Return -0.39% 2.06% -49.99% 15.78% 
  0.77 2.03 -9.70 29.06 
  1.09 1.34 -6.02 12.92 
alpha -0.04 0.03 -0.34 0.15 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of policy proxies, pricing factors and conditioning variables 
mean Stdev min max 
1 month Euribor 2.25% 1.54% 0.01% 5.05% 
Taylor Rule 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
Real Rate 0.27% 1.37% -2.32% 2.86%
PC1 0.00 2.92 -5.13 5.02 
TERM 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
DEF 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
Benchmark 0.00 0.03 -0.19 0.22 
def spread 0.88 0.63 0.14 3.59 
term spread 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03
          
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics for the funds within the sample, the pricing factors, monetary policy 
proxies and control variables. Panel A presents the total net assets, return (in local currency) and excess return of the 
one-month Euribor for all of the funds within the sample. Additionally and  are the full-sample regression 
coefficients on pricing factors of the two-factor model employed and alpha is the intercept of the regressions. Panel 
B presents descriptive statistics for the four monetary policy proxies (one-month Euribor, policy rule residual, ex-
post real rate and first principal component) as well as for the pricing factors (TEM and DEF), the benchmark 
returns and the control variables. Monthly data from the period of January 2000 to January 2013 was used.  
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Table 2: Cross Sectional distribution of two-factor model coefficient estimates: Individual funds 
  Coefficient Estimates   t-statistics   R2 
  
alpha TERM DEF alpha TERM DEF 
Minimum -0.34 -6.02 -9.70 -1861.52 -759.02 -2437.36 0.00 
Average -0.04 1.09 0.77 -3.25 2.11 1.29 0.84 
Maximum 0.15 12.92 29.06 0.94 2.13 2.63 0.99 
No. of funds 90 
No. of funds with <0 alpha 79 
No. of funds with >0 alpha 11 
No. of funds with <0 alpha significant at 5% 19 
No. of funds with >0 alpha significant at 5% 10 
 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of the coefficients and their t-statistics for the individual funds 
within the sample estimated using the unconditional two-factor model: , , , ,
, , where both the intercept and factors are held constant overtime.  The remaining rows summarize the funds that 
have intercepts that are statistically significant and different from zero.  
 
Table 3: Two-factor coefficient estimates: single equally-weighted portfolio 
  alpha TERM DEF N R2 
All Sample: Jan 2000 - Dec 2012 -0.05 1.46 0.61 156 0.40 
-17.97 10.32 3.98 
Pre-Crisis: Jan 2000 - Dec 2006 -0.04 1.14 0.39 84 0.72 
-19.50 9.05 2.75 
Post-Crisis: Jan 2007 - Dec 2012 -0.05 1.49 0.58 72 0.95 
-8.51 9.02 1.71 
 
This table shows the values of the coefficients and their t-statistics for the unconditional two-factor model: ,
, , , ,  tested on an equally-weighted portfolio of all funds in the sample and 
covering a period spanning from January 2000 to December 2012 (156 time-series observations). The full period 
was then portioned in order to understand any breaks from pre- to post-crisis into two subperiods: pre-crisis, which 
spans from January 2000 until December 2006 and post-crisis, which spans from January 2007 until December 
2012. The t-statics, in parentheses are Newey-West standard errors with six lags. The bold entries indicate 
significance at a level of 5%. 
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Table 4: Explaining : single equally-weighted portfolio 






Interest Rate PC1 
Panel A. All sample: September 2004 - Dec 2012         
monetary policy -69.43 -44.19 -49.21 -0.45 
(26.82) (42.32) (15.62) (0.09) 
benchmark 0.34 0.42 0.32 0.26 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) 
term spread -79.23 -0.18 -27.94 -75.53 
(40.79) (17.83) (19.06) (22.19) 
default spread 0.53 0.45 0.59 0.33 
(0.23) (0.28) (0.21) (0.16) 
constant 2.36 -0.66 0.17 1.03 
(1.09) (0.37) (0.28) (0.37) 
N 99 99 99 99 
R2 10.71% 14.01% 8.60% 18.94% 
Panel B. Pre - Crisis: September 2004 - Dec 2006         
monetary policy 17.33 2.46 5.73 0.09 
(6.57) (5.55) (2.99) (0.02) 
benchmark 0.05 0.36 0.05 0.04 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
term spread 6.01 -10.46 -2.98 2.67 
(7.67) (5.02) (6.70) (4.29) 
default spread -0.17 -0.18 -0.20 -0.11 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
constant -0.22 0.06 0.28 0.18 
(0.24) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
N 27 27 27 27 
R2 81.60% 53.31% 76.83% 77.90%
Panel C. Post - Crisis: Jan 2007 - Dec 2012           
monetary policy -99.38 -17.05 -49.96 -0.48 
(17.78) (41.95) (12.70) (0.07) 
benchmark 0.34 0.50 0.37 0.28 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) 
term spread -135.83 1.29 -35.70 -92.03 
(33.70) (18.32) (20.58) (18.62) 
default spread 0.49 0.32 0.53 0.24 
(0.17) (0.26) (0.19) (0.15) 
constant 4.23 -0.32 0.48 1.55 
(0.87) (0.37) (0.28) (0.32) 
N 72 72 72 72 
R2   38.28% 20.43% 29.99% 45.99% 
This tables shows the results obtained from , , , , , , , 
where , measures portfolio p’s exposure to default risk at time t, ,  is benchmark’s exposure to default risk,  
 and are the term and default spread, respectively.  Panel A present the results for the entire sample 
period from January 2000 to December 2012 and Panels B and C show the results from the pre- and post-crisis 
subperiods, respectively. Regarding the monetary policy indicators, four different alternatives (one-month Euribor, 
policy rule residual, ex-post real rate and first principal component) are reported in columns 2-5 respectively. The t-
statistics are reported below the coefficient results numbers in parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors with six lags. The values for monetary policy proxies in bold are those that are significant at a 5% 
significance level.  
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Table 5: Explaining  : single equally-weighted portfolio 






Interest Rate PC1 
Panel A. All sample: September 2004- Dec 2012         
monetary policy -8.81 -13.73 2.60 -0.04 
(14.56) (20.49) (7.85) (0.08) 
benchmark 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.17 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
term spread -2.11 5.20 11.85 2.31 
(22.42) (12.19) (13.14) (18.30) 
default spread 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.06 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) 
constant 0.84 0.46 0.46 0.62 
(0.65) (0.14) (0.18) (0.31) 
N 99 99 99 99 
R2 14.47% 11.09% 11.99% 15.15% 
Panel B. Pre - Crisis: September 2004 - Dec 2006       
monetary policy 62.83 22.14 19.14 0.30 
(7.75) (24.84) (12.15) (0.05)
benchmark 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.11 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
term spread 17.30 -34.77 -15.11 -0.45 
(10.76) (7.58) (15.34) (12.00) 
default spread -0.36 -0.42 -0.47 -0.15 
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.13) 
constant -1.04 1.13 0.79 0.44 
(0.24) (0.08) (0.24) (0.08) 
N 27 27 27 27 
R2 73.03% 80.71% 82.98% 85.21% 
Panel C. Post - Crisis: Jan 2007 - Dec 2012           
monetary policy -26.24 -23.27 -5.43 -0.11 
(17.26) (15.49) (7.82) (0.09) 
benchmark 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.07 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
term spread -19.59 8.16 12.90 -2.63 
(23.69) (9.75) (11.24) (17.78) 
default spread 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) 
constant 1.90 0.69 0.82 1.14 
(0.79) (0.13) (0.19) (0.37) 
N 72 72 72 72 
R2   1.55% 17.57% 17.51% 19.88% 
 
This tables shows the results obtained from , , , , ,
, , where ,  measures portfolio p’s exposure to interest rate risk at time t, ,  is benchmark’s exposure to 
interest rate risk,   is the term spread and is the default spread.  Panel A present the results for the 
entire sample period, which spans from January 2000 to December 2012 and Panels B and C show the results from 
the pre- and post-crisis subperiods, respectively. Regarding the monetary policy indicators, four different 
alternatives (one-month Euribor, policy rule residual, ex-post real rate and first principal component) are tested and 
reported in columns 2-5 respectively. The  t-statistics are reported below the coefficient results numbers in 
parentheses and are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with six lags. The values for monetary policy 
proxies in bold are those that are significant at a 5% significance level.   
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Table 6: The cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for the monetary policy indicators: Default-
risk exposure in individual funds 
  1-month rate   Taylor   real rate   pc1 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Minimum -283.81 0.86 -285.41 1.36 -386.69 0.85 -2.18 1.17 
Average 29.73 27.78 15.27 27.96 -6.26 15.67 0.09 0.11 
Maximum 382.11 381.29 596.41 365.77 170.63 155.65 1.01 0.01 
GMM -35.47 -46.65 -32.52 -0.20 
p-value 0.0000 0.0330 0.0000 0.0000 
No and % of funds 
t-stat < -2.58 18 8 16 14 
33.33% 14.81% 29.63% 25.93% 
-2.58 < t-stat < -1.96 1 5 3 6 
1.85% 9.26% 5.56% 11.11% 
-1.96 < t-stat < -1.65 3 5 3 3 
5.56% 9.26% 5.56% 5.56% 
-1.65 < t-stat < 0 12 10 13 12 
22.22% 18.52% 24.07% 22.22% 
0 < t-stat < 1.65 7 19 6 6 
12.96% 35.19% 11.11% 11.11% 
1.65 < t-stat < 1.96 2 1 3 1 
3.70% 1.85% 5.56% 1.85% 
1.96 < t-stat < 2.58 2 1 3 1 
3.70% 1.85% 5.56% 1.85% 
2.58 < t-stat 9 5 7 11 
16.67% 9.26% 12.96% 20.37% 
Total no. of funds 54 54 54 54 
No. of significantly <0 fund 12 10 13 12 
No. of significantly >0 fund 7 19 6 6 
                                
 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated coefficient and respective t-statistics at a fund-level 
for the following regression: , , , , , , , which breaks a 
fund’s exposure to default risk , into the benchmark index’s exposure to default risk , , the term spread 
, the default spread , and a monetary policy indicator . The table also provided results for the 
GMM test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the are jointly equal to zero 
for all of the funds meaning that under the null  does not explain the variation in the active portion of fixed-
income mutual fund default risk exposure. Four alternatives for monetary policy proxies are presented: the one-
month Euribor rate in columns 2-3, the policy rule residual in columns 4-5 followed by the ex-post real rate and the 
first principal component in columns 6-7 and 8-9, respectively.  Note that the GMM test statistic follows a chi-
square random distribution with N degrees of freedom and that the t-statistics of the individual fund regressions were 
computed using Newey-West standard errors with six lags.  
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Table 7: The cross-sectional distribution of t-statistics for the monetary policy indicators: Default-
risk exposure in individual funds  
  1-month rate   Taylor   real rate   pc1 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Minimum -461.19 0.71 -366.80 1.45 -202.97 0.67 -2.19 0.01 
Average 23.34 26.49 4.82 27.65 4.30 16.09 0.06 0.12 
Maximum 636.33 192.70 727.75 181.22 177.21 132.28 1.43 1.04 
GMM 5.27 0.86 15.53 0.05 
p-value 0.1630 0.9010 15.5254 0.0060 
No and % of funds 
t-stat < -2.58 5 3 4 8 
9.26% 5.56% 7.41% 14.81% 
-2.58 < t-stat < -1.96 3 3 1 2 
5.56% 5.56% 1.85% 3.70%
-1.96 < t-stat < -1.65 3 3 1 2 
5.56% 5.56% 1.85% 3.70% 
-1.65 < t-stat < 0 7 19 8 8 
12.96% 35.19% 14.81% 14.81% 
0 < t-stat < 1.65 21 15 11 13 
38.89% 27.78% 20.37% 24.07% 
1.65 < t-stat < 1.96 0 2 4 1 
0.00% 3.70% 7.41% 1.85% 
1.96 < t-stat < 2.58 6 4 4 6 
11.11% 7.41% 7.41% 11.11% 
2.58 < t-stat 9 5 21 14 
16.67% 9.26% 38.89% 25.93% 
Total no. of funds 54 54 54 54 
No. of significantly <0 fund 7 19 8 8 
No. of significantly >0 fund     21       15       11       13 
 
This table shows the cross-sectional distribution of the estimated coefficient and respective t-statistics at a fund-level 
for the following regression: , , , , , , , which 
breaks a fund’s exposure to default risk , into the benchmark index’s exposure to default risk , , the term 
spread , the default spread , and a monetary policy indicator . The table also provided results 
for the GMM test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the are jointly equal to 
zero for all of the funds meaning that under the null  does not explain the variation in the active portion of 
fixed-income mutual fund default risk exposure. Four alternatives for monetary policy proxies are presented: the 
one-month Euribor rate in columns 2-3, the policy rule residual in columns 4-5 followed by the ex-post real rate and 
the first principal component in columns 6-7 and 8-9, respectively.  Note that the GMM test statistic follows a chi-
square random distribution with N degrees of freedom and that the t-statistics of the individual fund regressions were 











Interest Rate PC1 
Panel A. All sample: September 2004 - Dec 2012       
Std. Dev. 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.54 
∆   -130.10% -54.56% -84.37% -147.66% 
∆   -11.71% -12.03% 3.17% -9.66% 
Panel B. Pre - Crisis: September 2004 - Dec 2006   
Std. Dev. 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.62 
∆   71.22% 11.73% 24.50% 63.60% 
∆   80.64% 32.97% 25.55% 69.11% 
Panel C. Post - Crisis: Jan 2007 - Dec 2012         
Std. Dev. 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.66 
∆   -134.66% -7.60% -61.65% -108.48% 
∆   -30.47% -8.89% -5.74% -21.17% 
 
This table reports the percentage change in and  due to a change of one standard deviation (Std. Dev.) in 
the monetary policy.  
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Figure 1: Monetary Policy Proxies 
 
This figure presents the four alternative monetary policy proxies used in the analysis: the one-month Euribor rate, 
the ex-post real rate, the policy rule residual (also known as the Taylor rule) and the first principal component of a 
cross-section of yields of different maturity German bunds and Euribor rates.  
 
Figure 2: Average Fund Return Volatility 
 
This figure depicts average volatility of the fund returns, in local currency, within the sample. The volatility was 





































































































































Figure 3: Time-varying risk exposures 
(a) DEF exposures 
 
(b) TERM exposures   
 
This figure presents the rolling betas for both DEF and TERM estimated with a 24-month rolling window across the 
time frame from January 2000 to December 2012. The solid line refers to the average risk exposure of all the funds 
in the sample and the dotted line shows the risk exposure of the benchmark. The time frame is partitioned into 
subperiods of high and low interest rates, where the cut-off point is the median interest in the period (2.39%). The 
first high period (rates above the median rate) is from Jan. 2000 until from Apr. 2003, followed by a period of lower 
rates from May 2003 until Jan. 2006 when rates begin to increase again and continue to do so from Feb. 2006 until 
Dec. 2008 and finally, in the aftermath of the financial crisis a period of low rates from Jan. 2009 until the end of the 
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